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When the Lights Went Out: Electricity in North Korea
and Dependency on Moscow
Benjamin R. Young*
The division of the Korean Peninsula has been symbolized by
electricity. While South Korea lights up on satellite images, North Korea
is dark. Using archival documents from North Korea’s former communist
allies and Pyongyang’s state-run media, the author argues that the
DPRK’s electricity shortages were not a result of the regime’s Juche
ideology but rather an outcome of overreliance on Soviet assistance.
This analysis disputes the notion of North Korea’s Juche ideology as
a totalizing phenomenon within the DPRK’s political structure. By
presenting a multifaceted history of North Korea’s electricity sector, the
author highlights the ways in which Pyongyang engaged with Soviet
electrification aid and global energy trends generally.
Keywords: North Korea, Kim Il Sung, Electricity, Russia, Kim Jong Un
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On December 22, 1920, Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin announced in a
report on the work of the Council of People’s Commissars, “Communism
is Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country. Otherwise the
country will remain a small-peasant country, and we must clearly realize
that.”1 As the founder of the first self-proclaimed workers’ state, Lenin’s
emphasis on electricity as the basis of communism would have
reverberations throughout the Eastern Bloc for decades to come. After the
division of the Korean Peninsula in 1945 between the Soviet-controlled
North and the U.S.-controlled South, electricity would become a symbol
of North Korean power. Founded in 1948, the government of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (the official title of North Korea,
hereafter DPRK) featured a coat of arms, which positioned a hydroelectric
power plant in the middle. Lenin’s expression of electricity as
communism was alive and well in the nascent DPRK.
However, as most outside observers are aware, North Korea is a
country that currently lacks sufficient electricity. The famous satellite
image of a dark North Korea contrasted with a well-lit South Korea
(officially known as the Republic of Korea, hereafter ROK) makes the
division all the more tangible. In 2002, U.S. Secretary of State Donald
Rumsfeld said, “If you look at a picture from the sky of the Korean
Peninsula at night, South Korea is filled with lights and energy and
vitality and a booming economy; North Korea is dark.” Rumsfeld
concludes, “It is a tragedy what is being done in that country.”2 The
regular blackouts in the DPRK, especially in the rural provinces, have
seemingly become the ultimate symbol of North Korea’s backwardness
and its dysfunctional economy. While scholars of North Korea often
emphasize the regime’s Juche ideology as the reason for the country’s
1

2

Vladimir Lenin, Report on the Work of the Council of People’s Commissars,
December 22, 1920. Original Source: Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 5th ed.
(Moscow, 1975-79), vol. 36, pp. 15-16, <http://soviethistory.msu.edu/1921-2/
electrification-campaign/communism-is-soviet-power-electrification-of-thewhole-country/> (date accessed December 17, 2019).
Donald H. Rumsfeld, Defense Department Briefing Transcript, December 23,
2002, <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2002/12/mil021223-usia01.htm> (date accessed December 17, 2019).
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electricity shortages, little systematic research has actually been done on
the history of North Korea’s electricity. One of the primary reasons for
this lack of research is due to the fact that the DPRK government does
not publish reliable economic data. Despite regular blackouts
throughout the country, North Korean state-run media regularly boasts
about the well-lit streets of Pyongyang and the robust industrial
production of the DPRK’s factories. In North Korea’s state-controlled
media landscape, it is hard to discern reality from propaganda.
However, with the help of archival documents from North Korea’s
former communist allies and a critical analysis of the Kim family
regime’s state-run media, I piece together a qualitative history of North
Korea’s electricity. In so doing, I argue that North Korea’s electricity
shortages were not a consequence of the regime’s Juche ideology but
rather a result of the DPRK’s overreliance on Soviet aid.
Analysts of North Korea often cite Juche ideology as a reason for the
country’s economic troubles and electricity blackouts. For example, ChaeJin Lee said, “Aside from the structural deficiencies of its centrally planned
economic system, North Korea suffered from the constraints of the Juche
(self-reliance) ideology and the heavy burden of defense expenditures.”3
Ian Rinehart explains, “Juche-inspired policies severely limited North
Korea’s economic growth by allocating scarce resources to unproductive
industries for the sake of self-reliance.”4 Valentin I. Moiseyev wrote that
“considering North Korea’s Juche tenets and, fearing a raw material
dependence on the Soviet Union (adding to the existing technological
dependence), Kim Il Sung insisted on using domestic coal as fuel for the
thermal power plants.”5 While the costs of North Korea’s excessive
militarization surely deepened the country’s economic issues,
3
4
5

Chae-Jin Lee, A Troubled Peace: U.S. Policy and the Two Koreas (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 2006), pp. 283-284.
Ian Rinehart, “Nothing to be Afraid Of? North Korean Political Economy and
Economic Reform,” Korea Economic Institute, Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Emerging Voices Working Paper, vol. 22 (2011), p. 8.
Valentin I. Moiseyev, “The North Korean Energy Sector,” in The North Korean
Nuclear Program Security, Strategy and New Perspectives from Russia, ed. James
Moltz Clay and Alexandre Y. Mansourov (New York: Routledge, 1999), p. 53.
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Pyongyang’s adherence to Juche ideology as an economic model and
electrification strategy seems to be based on mere assumption.
In order to dig deeper into this assumption, it is important to
discuss Juche ideology. In 1955, Kim Il Sung first promoted the idea of
Juche within the DPRK. He said, “What is Juche in our Party's
ideological work? What are we doing? We are not engaged in any other
country's revolution, but precisely in the Korean revolution…. Therefore,
all ideological work must be subordinated to the interests of the Korean
revolution.”6 This ideology, which champions self-reliance and selfsufficiency, has continued to inform official DPRK rhetoric since 1955.
However, as this article explains, North Korea’s dependence on Soviet
aid for electricity stands in stark contrast to the nationalistic character of
the Juche ideology. So what does Juche mean? Bruce Cumings explains,
“The term is really untranslatable; the closer one gets to its meaning, the
more the meaning slips away.”7 Bradley K. Martin explains that the
broader meaning of Juche is “putting Korea first.”8 Alzo David-West
contends that “Juche is not a philosophy, but an ideology of political
justification for the dictatorship of Kim Il Sung.”9 Perhaps the one
characteristic of Juche that all of these scholars can agree upon is that the
ideology was designed to signify North Korean autonomy, whether real
or perceived. “Self-reliance” is the general definition fixed upon Juche by
North Korea scholars and many of these analysts grasp for a deeper
meaning beyond this simple phrase. However, what has been missed in
most analyses of Juche is the extent to which it represents the DPRK’s
utopian motivations.
6
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9

Kim Il Sung, “On eliminating dogmatism and formalism and establishing Juche
in ideological work,” Kim Il Sung: Selected Works 1 (1955), p. 582-606, <https://
www.marxists.org/archive/kim-il-sung/1955/12/28.htm> (date accessed May
17, 2020).
Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York: W.W.
Norton & Co., 1997), p. 404.
Bradley K. Martin, Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader (New York: Thomas
Dunne Books, 2004), p. 363.
Alzo David-West, “Between Confucianism and Marxism-Leninism: Juche and the
Case of Chong Tasan,” Korean Studies, vol. 35 (2011), p. 107.
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The North Korean leadership hoped to build a staunchly
independent economy based on Juche’s utopian principles of selfreliance, self-strengthening, and self-sufficiency. As with most Marxist
states, utopianism was a central component of the state’s future-oriented
political culture. Lenin wrote in What Is To Be Done? that communists
“should dream.”10 Utopian thought was a way to construct a shared
value system, revolutionary society, and new collective consciousness.
Robert Winstanley-Chesters writes, “Juche has been the vessel through
which utopian possibility has filtered into the more conventional forms
of developmental and institutional approach and governmental function
in North Korea as well as in its narratives of presentation, support, and
legitimacy.”11 Despite this Juche rhetoric, North Korea was heavily
dependent on the Communist Bloc for aid throughout the Cold War era.
According to the U.S. Library of Congress’s official book North Korea: A
Country Study, “Estimates vary, but it is likely that the equivalent of U.S.
$4.75 billion of aid was accepted [by North Korea] between 1946 and
1984. Almost 46 percent of the assistance came from the Soviet Union,
followed by China with about 18 percent, and the rest from East
European communist countries.”12 Liudmila Zakharova explains, “By
the early 1990s, the facilities built in the DPRK with Soviet help
produced up to 70% of electricity, 50% of chemical fertilisers, and about
40% of ferrous metals. The aluminum industry was created entirely by
Soviet specialists. Approximately, 70 large industrial enterprises in
North Korea were built with the assistance of the USSR.”13 Therefore,
Juche was not an economic blueprint for North Korea but a form of
10 Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, “What Is To Be Done?,” Lenin’s Selected Works, vol. 1, first
published as a separate work in March 1902, <https://www.marxists.org/
archive/lenin/works/1901/witbd/v.htm> (date accessed May 17, 2020).
11 Robert Winstanley-Chesters, Environment, Politics, and Ideology in North Korea:
Landscape as Political Project (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2014), p. 5.
12 Andrea Matles Savada, ed., North Korea: A Country Study (Washington: GPO for
the Library of Congress, 1993), <http://countrystudies.us/north-korea/54.htm>
(date accessed May 17, 2020).
13 Liudmila Zakharova, “Economic Cooperation between Russia and North Korea:
New Goals and New Approaches,” Journal of Eurasian Studies, vol. 7, no. 2 (July
2016), p. 152.
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utopianism that the Kim family regime sought to achieve one day. North
Korea’s electricity shortages were not a result of the leadership’s strict
adherence to Juche ideology as they never strictly followed a policy of
economic self-sufficiency.
While the DPRK and the Soviet Union sometimes disagreed with
each other’s policies, Pyongyang depended on Moscow for technical
assistance and financial aid.14 In the same 1955 speech where Kim Il
Sung first promoted Juche, he also praised Soviet internationalism. He
said, “For the victory of the Korean revolution and for the great cause of
the international working class, we should strengthen solidarity with the
Soviet people, our liberator and helper, and with the peoples of all the
socialist countries.”15 Without Moscow’s help, the DPRK most likely
would not have survived as a nation-state during the Cold War era.
Despite officially promoting self-reliance in public discourse, the North
Korean leadership depended heavily on Soviet technical expertise for
electric power. Whether it was the construction of the Supung Power
Plant or the delivery of fuel, the Soviet Union invested heavily in the
DPRK’s electrification. By relying so heavily on Soviet assistance, the
North Korean leadership was unprepared for the Soviet Union’s sudden
dissolution in the 1990s.
While the North Korean government imposes a strict information
blockade on international news and events, electricity is one of the few
areas where the average North Korean can tangibly see the opaque partystate’s difficulties. As journalist Barbara Demick explains, “North
Koreans complain bitterly about the darkness, which they still blame on
the U.S. sanctions. They can’t read at night. They can’t watch television.
‘We have no culture without electricity,’ a burly North Korean security
guard once told me accusingly.”16 In addition with satellite imagery, the
14 Harry Gelman and Norman D. Levin, “The Future of Soviet-North Korean
Relations,” Rand Corporation - A Project Air Force Report Prepared for the
United States Air Force (October 1984), pp. 1-52.
15 Kim Il Sung, “On eliminating dogmatism and formalism and establishing Juche
in ideological work.”
16 Barbara Demick, Nothing to Envy: Ordinary Lives in North Korea (New York:
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outside world now sees the glaring inefficiencies of the DPRK’s power
grid. However, outside of Demick’s journalistic account of North Korea
in the mid-1990s, few scholars have qualitatively examined the history of
the DPRK’s electricity sector and the ways in which the leadership in
Pyongyang addressed electricity scarcity in the country. The notable
exception here is Alex S. Forster’s 2014 paper, entitled “Electrifying North
Korea,” which focuses more on contemporary energy issues in the DPRK
and how to address them.17 Scholars have not systematically investigated
the transition of postcolonial North Korea with its mighty hydroelectric
power plants to a candle-lit nation that now deals with regular blackouts.
Using qualitative data analysis from Communist Bloc archives and
declassified U.S. government documents, I argue that in order to better
understand the DPRK’s electricity shortages, we must look at the history
of the Soviet Union’s electrification aid to North Korea.

From Postcolonialism to Postwar: North Korea, 1945-1959
While the Japanese colonialists exploited the natural resources and
labor of the Korean people, they did leave one benefit behind in their
destructive wake: large-scale hydroelectric power plants. According to
Andrei Lankov, the northern part of Korea produced 85% of all of the
peninsula’s electricity in 1940.18 These large-scale facilities, which were
primarily concentrated in northern Korea due to its mountainous terrain,
became massively useful for Kim Il Sung’s nascent regime. In fact,
immediately after the collapse of the Japanese Empire in 1945, North
Korea started selling electric power to their southern brethren. In January
1947, the Colonel-General of Soviet forces in North Korea, Terenty Fomich
Shtykov, sent a letter to the U.S. General-Lieutenant in South Korea, John
Random House, 2010), p. 4.
17 Alex S. Forster, “Electrifying North Korea: Bringing Power to Underserved
Marginal Populations in the DPRK,” East-West Center Working Papers, no. 69 (April
2014), pp. 1-24.
18 Andrei Lankov, The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 72.
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R. Hodge, in which he alerted the Americans that South Korea had not
paid for any electricity that was provided by the north. According to the
letter, the bill in U.S. dollars was $4,240,261. Shtykov explained, “This
arrangement has led to the economic downfall of North Korean power
stations. Due to the balance deficit, major repairs and equipment
maintenance are not taking place, and there are great delays in the salary
of the maintenance personnel.”19 This image of an energy-deficient South
Korea and a high-powered North Korea in the post-liberation period
stands in stark contrast to the present-day electricity situations of the two
Koreas. With substantial rainfall, North Korea’s hydroelectric stations
were producing large amounts of power in the post-liberation era.
American journalist Anna Louse Strong visited the DPRK in 1948
and remarked, “The great power stations on the Yalu River were built by
the Japanese. The Russians seized them as war booty and promptly gave
them ‘to the Korean people’ in the summer of 1946.” In fact, Soviet
engineers hoped to replicate the design of the Yalu River hydroelectric
power plant’s generators for their own country’s energy sector.
According to a declassified U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
document, Soviet specialists dismantled two generators and two
transformers in December 1945 from the DPRK’s Supung power plant
and transported them to the Soviet Union.20 On March 5, 1949, Kim Il
Sung told Stalin “that after the liberation of Korea by Soviet troops, the
Soviet Government and the Soviet Army rendered aid to Korea in the
matter of economic development.” Kim continued, “The assistance of
the Soviet Union is required for the further development of the Korean
economy and culture.”21 Strong explained that the U.S. forces in South
19 "Letter to General-Lieutenant Hodge on Northern Korea Providing Electricity
to Southern Korea," January 01, 1947, History and Public Policy Program Digital
Archive, TsAMO, Fond not listed, Opis 480c, Delo 25, listi 22-23. Obtained
by Kim Dong-gil and translated by Aleksandr Gorokhov and James Person,
<https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114896> (date accessed
May 17, 2020).
20 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), “Report on the Electrical Industry in North
Korea,” Information Report, January 1957, p. 16.
21 “Notes of the Conversation between Comrade I.V. Stalin and a Governmental
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Korea were not paying their electric bills to Pyongyang as the North
Korean government demanded payment in electric equipment, not U.S.
dollars or goods. Strong added, “The Americans offered nylon stockings
and tobacco and Hollywood movies. But the North Koreans stood pat
on getting electric equipment.” Strong continued, “The reason was plain:
so much electric development was going on in all the farming villages of
North Korea that they simply could not spare power for South Korea
unless they got more equipment. It was as simple as that.”22 In May
1948, the North Koreans shut off the power to South Korea altogether.
The situation for North Korea’s energy infrastructure predictably
deteriorated during the Korean War. According to Cheehyung Harrison
Kim, “In June 1950, 90 percent of North Korea’s electric power potential
was wiped out.”23 Due to U.S. aerial bombardment, a majority of the
hydroelectric power plants were out of commission from 1950 to 1953. In
an August 1952 report, the Polish embassy in the DPRK commented,
“The bombing of four large hydro-electric power stations on Yalu on
20-23 June of this year deprived all of North Korea and a part of NorthEastern China of electric energy, that is, industry stopped almost
completely, some rice fields that were artificially irrigated and cities
remained without water.” The report continued, “Electrification is
universal in Korea, and therefore a shortage of electric energy is felt so
strongly.” The Korean War devastated North Korea’s electric output, and
this wreaked havoc on the entire country’s economy.
Less than a year later, the Polish embassy explained, “The bombarding
of the electric power plant in Supung in July 1952, and the subsequent
Delegation from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea headed by Kim Il
Sung,” March 05, 1949, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AVP
RF, fond 059a, opis 5a, delo 3, papka 11, listy 10-20, and RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d.
346, ll. 0013-0023, <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112127>
(date accessed May 17, 2020).
22 Anna Louise Strong, “In North Korea: First Eye-Witness Report,” <https://
www.marxists.org/reference/archive/strong-anna-louise/1949/in-northkorea/ch07.htm> (date accessed May 17, 2020).
23 Cheehyung Harrison Kim, Heroes and Toilers: Work as Life in Postwar North Korea
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), p. 76.
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destruction of other electric power plants, has largely made the execution of
plans for industry and agriculture difficult, since the basic sources of energy
were destroyed or damaged.” The report added, “Not only industry but
also rice paddies, which are artificially watered by electric pumps, have
been endangered.”24 As the Polish diplomatic reports explain, electricity
from hydroelectric power plants also fueled agricultural pumps on North
Korean farms. This overreliance on hydroelectricity would later have
devastating effects for the North Korean people during periods of drought.
After the war, the Korean Workers’ Party immediately established a
five-year plan for rebuilding the country’s economy. Due to assistance
from the Communist Bloc, especially the Soviet Union, North Korea’s
postwar development was rapid. The postwar reconstruction plan
stressed “the production of electric turbines, which are indispensable to
equipping the rebuilt power plants.”25 With Soviet assistance, the North
Koreans emphasized the rebuilding of the Supung power plant. The
Japanese colonialists originally built the Supung power plant in 1943,
which was the largest hydroelectric facility of its kind in Asia at the
time.26 On one hand, North Korea depended on Soviet aid in the
postwar period but on the other hand, Kim Il Sung started to promote
an independent line. Kim Il Sung’s 1955 Juche speech to North Korean
propagandists was the first clear expression of Korean nationalism. In
1959, Juche started to appear widely in internal Korean Workers’ Party
reports and lectures. Pak Deok-hwan, a Soviet-Korean and counselor in
24 "Note from the Embassy of the Polish Republic in Korea," January 27, 1953,
History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Polish Foreign Ministry
Archive. Obtained for NKIDP by Jakub Poprocki and translated for NKIDP by
Maya Latynski, <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114945>
(date accessed May 17, 2020).
25 “Report no. 5 of the Embassy of the People’s Republic of Poland in the
Democratic Republic of Korea for the Period of 1 August 1953 to 30 September
1953,” September 30, 1953, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive,
Polish Foreign Ministry Archive. Obtained for NKIDP by Jakub Poprocki and
translated for NKIDP by Maya Latynski, <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.
org/document/114958> (date accessed May 17, 2020).
26 Hy-Sang Lee, North Korea: A Strange Socialist Fortress (Westport, Connecticut:
Praeger Publishers, 2000), p. 102.
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the DPRK’s Foreign Ministry, explained that the substance of Juche “was
that everything Korean is better compared to [anything] foreign.”27
Despite Kim’s promotion of Juche in 1955, the Supung power plant on
the Yalu River, also known as the Amnok River, became a symbol of SovietDPRK comradeship during the mid to late 1950s. The KWP’s Central
Committee explained in their August 1953 plenum, “Thanks to the
enormous technical and material assistance from the Soviet Union, the
DPRK government has begun to rebuild the largest power plant on the
river Amnok in Supung, which was damaged during the war.” The
committee announced, “This year still, the Supung power plant is to
produce three times more electrical energy than it does currently. Right
now, thanks to the evacuation in the war of its valuable equipment, the
workers are completing the assembly and restoration of one of the largest
generators in that power plant.” As this Polish report mentions, much of
the “valuable” equipment from the Supung power plant was evacuated
during the Korean War. As Cheehyung Harrison Kim explains, “The
wartime production regime involved the relocation of production sites
(sogae) – the tremendous project of dismantling vital factories, evacuating
them to safe locations, often underground or in caves, and reassembling
them to resume production.”28 The North Koreans used their mountainous
landscape to their advantage during wartime and hid their most valuable
industrial equipment from U.S. air bombing in this rugged terrain.
It was in the immediate postwar period when the Kim family
regime decided to focus its energy resources on the capital city,
Pyongyang. As the showcase capital and home of the most loyal KWP
members, the residents of Pyongyang have historically enjoyed longer
bouts of electricity than their countrymen in the provinces. According to
Kim Il Sung himself, 36% of the North Korean countryside had no access
27 “From the Journal of N. Ye. Torbenkov, Record of a Conversation with
DPRK MFA Counselor Pak Deok-hwan,” June 01, 1960, History and Public
Policy Program Digital Archive, Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.
AVPRF fond 0102, opis 16, delo 6, <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/
document/121622> (date accessed May 17, 2020).
28 Kim, Heroes and Toilers, p.30.
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to electricity in 1958.29 As explained in his first five-year plan, Kim Il
Sung intended to build a thermal power station in Pyongyang in order
to give those residents central heating. In 1957, the Soviet ambassador to
the DPRK, A.M Puzanov, remarked in his journal, “An important task of
the heat and power station will be to supply the housing facilities of the
capital with heat for central heating. This heat and power station will
also yield electrical power and improve the republic's energy mix during
low loads due to a shortage of water for hydroelectric power plants.”30
While Pyongyang residents enjoyed central heating during the winter
months, those in rural areas dealt with inconsistent electricity or
complete blackouts.
The North Korea electrical grid was heavily dependent on rainfall
in the Yalu River area. Thus, Kim Il Sung intended to diversify the
electrical grid of the DPRK away from large-scale hydroelectric power
plants on the Yalu River. In 1958, Kim told China’s Premier Zhou Enlai
about severe droughts in North Korea and the problems this caused for
the country’s electric output. Kim explained, “This year has had the least
amount of rain water [on record]. The elderly say that this is the worst it
has been in 100 years… At present, we have started an electricity
conservation campaign [because] in the past [electricity] was wasted.”31
Kim suggested the construction of small-scale hydroelectric plants,
rather than the large-scale facilities originally built by the Japanese, for
29 "Record of Conversation from the Premier's Reception of the Korean Government
Delegation," November 22, 1958, History and Public Policy Program Digital
Archive, PRC FMA 204-00064-02, 9-25. Translated by Jeffrey Wang and Charles
Kraus, <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114176> (date
accessed May 17, 2020).
30 "Journal of Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK A.M. Puzanov for 8 June 1957,"
June 08, 1957, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AVPRF F.
0102, Op. 13, P. 72, Delo 5, Listy 114-130. Translated by Gary Goldberg, <https://
digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115624> (date accessed May 17, 2020).
31 "Record of Conversation from the Premier's Reception of the Korean Government
Delegation," November 22, 1958, History and Public Policy Program Digital
Archive, PRC FMA 204-00064-02, 9-25. Translated by Jeffrey Wang and Charles
Kraus, <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114176> (date
accessed May 17, 2020).
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rural areas. Kim explained, “We have already established some smallscale hydroelectric power stations in rural areas, and we estimate that by
next year all rural areas will have electricity.”32 While Kim’s energy plan
for all of rural North Korea obviously did not come to fruition, his focus
on electricity in his nation-building program was in line with Lenin’s
original motif that “Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification
of the whole country.”
One of the major reasons for North Korea’s poor electric output was
its overreliance on these outdated large-scale hydroelectric power plants.
In May 1964, Kim Il Sung vented his frustrations to his Chinese
counterparts, “The Japanese constructed Supung Dam is of poor quality
and requires repairs every year. It is really bad. It took the Japanese nine
years to build the Supung Dam.” 33 Electricity and industry were
intimately linked in the DPRK due to the country’s reliance on
hydropower. As Hy-Sang Lee explains, “Though very low in operating
costs, hydropower plants required the highest investment cost per unit
of generating capacity created.”34 In June 1960, the Soviet Foreign
Ministry’s Far East Department commented, “As the past year showed,
electric power is the bottleneck in industry. In 1959 the electric power
industry produced 7.8 billion kilowatt-hours against the 9.7 billion
kilowatt-hours planned for the next year of the five-year plan.”35
32 "Record of Conversation from the Premier's Reception of the Korean Government
Delegation," November 22, 1958, History and Public Policy Program Digital
Archive, PRC FMA 204-00064-02, 9-25. Translated by Jeffrey Wang and Charles
Kraus, <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114176> (date
accessed May 17, 2020).
33 “Cable from the Jilin Provincial Party Committee, 'Report on Comrade Kim
Il Sung's Report',” May 09, 1964, History and Public Policy Program Digital
Archive, PRC FMA 106-00767-02, 14-18. Obtained by Shen Zhihua and translated
by Jeffrey Wang and Charles Kraus, <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/
document/116547> (date accessed May 17, 2020).
34 Lee, North Korea, p. 102.
35 "The Economic and Political Situation of the DPRK," June 12, 1960, History
and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AVPRF fond 0102, opis 16, papka
87, delo 27. Translated for NKIDP by Gary Goldberg, <https://digitalarchive.
wilsoncenter.org/document/116389> (date accessed May 17, 2020).
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Electricity Conservation in North Korea from the 1960s to the
Early 1990s
In 1960, the DPRK government formally asked the Soviet Union for
technical assistance in building a large-capacity thermal power station
and hydroelectric facilities. Due to a lack of technical expertise within
the country, the North Korean leadership depended on Soviet specialists
for assistance. In March 1960, the North Korean government sent “a
request to the Soviet government to provide technical help by sending
skilled specialists to assist in the planning and manufacture of turbine
generators (60 Hz, 6-25,000 kilovolt-amperes), turbines, boilers, etc.”36
Despite this dependence on Soviet aid, the year 1960 was actually a
period of high electric output for the North Korean people due to above
average rainfall. In August 1960, Kim Il Sung told the Soviet ambassador
to the DPRK, “In particular, there is so much water on the Yalu [Amnokgang] River that a surplus of it in enormous quantities was thrown over
the reserve sluices of the Supung Hydroelectric Station and there was
even a danger of flooding Sinuiju. At the present time Pyongyang is
receiving electricity without restrictions.”37 However, the DPRK’s
dependence on rainfall in the Yalu River basin for electricity meant the
countryside was extremely susceptible to irregular rainfall and
subsequent blackouts.
In addition, since the Yalu River borders China and North Korea,
coownership of the body of water was negotiable. In 1955, the two sides
agreed in principle to share the energy generated by the river. The
Supung power station on the Yalu River was actually joint managed by
36 "Journal of Soviet Ambassador in the DPRK A.M. Puzanov for 30 March 1960,"
March 30, 1960, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AVPRF
fond 0102, opis 16, delo 6, p.129-146. Translated for NKIDP by Gary Goldberg,
<https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116168> (date accessed
May 17, 2020).
37 "Journal of Soviet Ambassador in the DPRK A.M. Puzanov for 16 August 1960,"
August 16, 1960, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AVPRF fond
0102, opis 16, delo 7, p.43-71. Translated for NKIDP by Gary Goldberg, <https://
digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/119446> (date accessed May 17, 2020).
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Beijing and Pyongyang. However, Kim Il Sung complained that the
DPRK received a lower share of the power generated from Supung
station.38 It was during China’s Cultural Revolution that relations
between the two neighboring countries quickly soured and border river
usage became heavily politicized. In the late 1960s, the Yalu River in
particular became an ideological battleground between China’s zealous
Maoist sycophants, better known as the Red Guards, and North Korea’s
state security services. In January 1969, the Soviet embassy in the DPRK
commented, “According to the testimony of eyewitnesses, a sort of
propaganda duel is being waged on the Korean-Chinese border passing
along the Yalu River: enormous portraits of the leaders, billboards with
political content, and loudspeakers directed at the opposite bank have
been set up on both sides of the river.”39 In the late 1960s, relations
between the PRC and DPRK were not “as close as lips to teeth,” which
was the traditional expression of revolutionary solidarity between the
two neighboring Asian communist governments.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Chinese government started
building dikes on PRC-DPRK border rivers without approaching the
North Korean leadership first. Thus, the North Korean leadership held
talks with the PRC government in 1970 regarding joint utilization of the
border waters. The Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK, Nikolay
Georgievich Sudarikov, explained to his Hungarian counterparts that
the North Korean Deputy Foreign Minister Kim Jae-bong was
particularly unhappy about Chinese construction on border rivers. The
North Korean official explained, “Some of the dikes which the Chinese
side recently built on the border rivers deprive Korea of the natural
water output of the rivers and thus hinder the utilization of the latter,
while the other dikes, during heavy raining, expose the Korean villages
and areas to flooding and inundation; at the same time, both types of the
38 Lee, North Korea, p. 102.
39 "First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in North Korea, 'Korean-Chinese Relations
in the Second Half of 1968'," January 06, 1969, History and Public Policy Program
Digital Archive, RGANI, fond 5, opis 61, delo 466, listy 1-14. Obtained by
Sergey Radchenko and translated by Gary Goldberg, <https://digitalarchive.
wilsoncenter.org/document/134218> (date accessed May 17, 2020).
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Chinese dike systems hinder shipping on the border rivers.”40 While the
Soviet Union greatly assisted their North Korean comrades in
constructing their energy sector, the People’s Republic of China
oftentimes made life worse for their energy-deficient neighbors.
From the mid-1960s to the early 1970s, energy problems within the
DPRK came to a head and the North Korean government started
nationwide energy conservation drives. In 1966, the North Korean
magazine Chollima published an article, entitled “Electricity and Life,”
in which the author Cho Chʻŏn-ho explained, “The easiest thing we can
do is to conserve electricity and the best thing to do for the nation is to
conserve electricity.” He continued, “Those who produce electricity will
try hard to produce more power and those who consume will
conserve.”41 In March 1969, the Soviet Foreign Ministry’s Far East
Department said, “The difficulties caused by drought in a number of
regions of the country has also had an effect on the operation of industry.
The shortage of water in reservoirs has led to a reduction of the
production of electrical power, as a result of which in the first half of
1968 production capacity in the chemical, foundry, and other energyintensive industries was [3]0-[6]0 % used.”42 In April 1968, Dr. Ervin
Jávor, the Chairman of the Hungarian-Korean Commission of Technical
and Scientific Cooperation, explained, “Although by now they have
built a great number of hydroelectric power plants […], the DPRK is
struggling with considerable energy problems. For the sake of
conserving energy, workers in the production plants take their day off
40 "Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign
Ministry," May 05, 1970, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive,
MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1970, 54. doboz, 81, 00843/7/1970. Obtained and
translated for NKIDP by Balázs Szalontai, <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.
org/document/116578> (date accessed May 17, 2020).
41 Cho Chʻŏn-ho, “Chŏnʾgi wa uri saenghwal,” Chollima (April 1966), pp. 27-29.
42 "Far East Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'The Domestic Situation and
the Foreign Policy of the Korean People's Democratic Republic'," March 28,
1969, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, RGANI, fond 5, opis
61, delo 466, listy 71-81. Obtained by Sergey Radchenko and translated by Gary
Goldberg, <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/134226> (date
accessed May 17, 2020).
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on a staggered schedule rather than on the same day of the week.”43
Even communist allies of the North Korean socialist system noticed how
dire the energy situation was in the country during the late 1960s.
North Korea’s electricity shortages in the 1960s and 1970s correlated
with an increase in Pyongyang’s public promotion of Juche. For
example, in 1965, Kim Il Sung gave a speech in Indonesia where he
outlined the main principles of Juche and in 1972 Juche was cemented as
the Party’s guiding ideological force in the DPRK’s Constitution. During
a visit to Jakarta in 1965, Kim Il Sung emphasized that “our Party
consistently sticks to self- reliance in ideology, sovereignty in politics,
independence in economy, and self-protection in national defense.”44
Seven years later, Juche was enshrined in North Korea’s political culture.
Ironically, at the same time as Kim Il Sung depended on Soviet energy
assistance, the DPRK’s Constitution underwent a Juche-inspired
revision in 1972. Article Four of the North Korea’s revised 1972
Constitution stated, “The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is
guided in its activity by the Juche idea of the Workers’ Party of Korea, a
creative application of Marxism-Leninism to the conditions of our
country.”45 Instead of reaffirming Marxism-Leninism as the ideological
foundation of the Korean Workers’ Party, the DPRK government
positioned Juche as a uniquely Korean approach to Marxism-Leninism.
Behind the public Juche discourse, North Korea continued to ask
Moscow for assistance in improving the country’s electrical grid. In 1969,
the North Korean leadership attached “great importance to accelerating
the construction of the Bukchang [Pukchang] thermal power station
43 "Report on the 27 March-2 April 1968 session of the Hungarian-Korean
Commission of Technical and Scientific Cooperation," April 16, 1968, History and
Public Policy Program Digital Archive, MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1968, 58. doboz, 5,
001364/3/1968. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Balazs Szalontai, <https://
digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110629> (date accessed May 17, 2020).
44 Seong-Chang Cheong, "Stalinism and Kimilsungism: A Comparative Analysis of
Ideology and Power," Asian Perspective, vol. 24, no. 1 (2000), p. 142.
45 Christopher Hale, “Multifunctional Juche: A Study of the Changing Dynamic
between Juche and the State Constitution in North Korea,” Korea Journal, vol. 42,
no. 3 (Autumn 2002), p. 296.
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being built with the technical assistance of the Soviet Union.” On
December 2, 1969, Kim Il, a North Korean Politburo member, told the
Soviet embassy in Pyongyang, “We need three units with a total capacity
of 300,000 kwt to be in operation at this station by the end of 1969 and a
fourth unit in the first quarter of 1970.” Kim Il admitted, “Even
considering the putting of this additional capacity in operation, the
country’s economy will nevertheless experience a shortage of a supply
of electric power.” The North Korean official added “that everything
possible [must] be done to accelerate the installation of equipment at the
Bukchang thermal power station. While he said this he stressed that the
Soviet specialists at Bukchang are working very well.” 46 It was
increasingly clear that Pyongyang promoted Juche in public-oriented
rhetoric but when it came to actual practice, Kim Il Sung’s regime
depended heavily on Soviet electrification aid.
In the early 1970s, North Korea’s energy sector continued to suffer
from its unreliable hydroelectric power plants. In a June 28, 1972
conversation with I.T Novikov, the Deputy Chairman of the USSR
Council of Ministers, Kim Il Sung said, “The Pyongyang TEhTs [thermal
power plant] and the Bukchang TEhS [thermal power station], built with
the aid of the Soviet Union, have helped during this difficult period, as a
result of which the chronic shortage of electrical power was overcome to
a considerable degree.” Kim continued, “However, this has nevertheless
been insufficient.”47 This contradiction between state ideology and
46 “From the Journal of N.G. Sudarikov, 'Record of a Conversation with Kim Il,
Member of the KWP CC Politburo and First Deputy Chairman of the DPRK
Cabinet of Ministers',” December 02, 1969, History and Public Policy Program
Digital Archive, RGANI, fond 5, opis 61, delo 463, listy 267-272. Contributed by
Sergey Radchenko and translated by Gary Goldberg, <https://digitalarchive.
wilsoncenter.org/document/134266> (date accessed May 17, 2020).
47 “From the Journal of Y.D. Fadeev, 'Record of Conversation between I.T. Novikov,
Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and Kim Il Sung, General
Secretary of the KWP CC and Chairman of the DPRK Cabinet of Ministers, 28
June 1972',” July 03, 1972, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive,
RGANI, f. 5, op. 64, d. 423, ll. 20-32. Contributed by Sergey Radchenko and
translated by Gary Goldberg, <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/
document/134136> (date accessed May 17, 2020).
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action suggests that North Korea’s electrification strategy depended on
Soviet aid, not the Juche idea.
In the 1970s, South Korea built its first nuclear power plant in Gori, a
village on the outskirts of Busan, which exacerbated concerns in the
DPRK that the Republic of Korea (the official title of South Korea, ROK)
was quickly becoming the dominant economic power on the peninsula.
Kim Il Sung admitted to Soviet officials in 1972 that North Korea was
“experiencing those difficulties which for Soviet people are a past stage,
that is, we are behind you.”48 The North Korean leader understood that
his country was underdeveloped vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Despite his
public-facing Juche rhetoric, Kim was never shy about requesting energy
assistance from his Soviet comrades. In 1979, the Hungarian ambassador
to the DPRK explained, “With the nuclear power plant in Gori included,
the output of electric power generation in South Korea reached 6.59
million kW. With the completion and activation of the sixth nuclear
power plant, in 1986 its output will reach 20 million kW.” He continued,
“By the end of 1986 they want to complete and operate 7 nuclear power
plants, 5 hydroelectric power stations, 24 thermal power stations, and an
ebb and flow power plant. 26 nuclear power plants will be built by 2000.”
With South Korea’s nuclear development, Kim Il Sung increasingly felt
that the DPRK would be left behind in this inter-Korean competition.
Faced with the idea of a more prosperous and electrified ROK, the
leadership in Pyongyang “strongly urged the socialist countries—for
instance, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and China—to
provide it with equipment for nuclear power plants or even to build a
nuclear power plant.” The Hungarian ambassador then concluded, “It
tries to make up for its lag behind South Korea in this way, with the
hidden intention that later it may become capable of producing an
48 “From the Journal of N.G. Sudarikov, 'Record of a Conversation with Kim Il
Sung, General Secretary of the KWP CC and Chairman of the DPRK Cabinet
of Ministers, 9 October 1972',” November 16, 1972, History and Public Policy
Program Digital Archive, RGANI, f. 5, op. 64, d. 423, ll. 38-53. Contributed by
Sergey Radchenko and translated by Gary Goldberg, <https://digitalarchive.
wilsoncenter.org/document/134145> (date accessed May 17, 2020).
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atomic bomb.” While North Korea’s electricity problems were most
likely not the primary cause for the Kim family regime’s pursuit of
nuclear technology, it seems that it played a small role in the
construction of the DPRK’s nuclear program.
In the 1980s, Kim Il Sung faced a dilemma: continue his emphasis
on hydroelectric power or foster the development of coal-powered
thermal power stations. At the Sixth Party Congress in 1980, the North
Korean leader stated, “Together with the construction of hydropower
plants it is necessary to widen the construction of thermal power plants
(TPPs)…. To start a wide construction of TPPs performing on low-calorie
coals, as well as that of medium and small TPPs using the radiating and
excessive heats.”49 Hydroelectric power stations were too dependent on
rainfall while thermal power stations depended on the DPRK’s scanty
coal reserves. As Hy-Sang Lee explains, “Behind the emergent shortage
of coal was everything that was wrong with Juche socialism – the
technical obsolescence, shortages of equipment and supplies, shortage of
manpower, etc., all of which applied not just to the coal industry but to
others as well except ordnance.”50 However, a third possibility for
solving North Korea’s electricity scarcity problem was nuclear energy. In
his Sixth Party Congress speech, Kim acknowledged, “In order to
sharply increase electric energy production, it is necessary to build an
atomic power plant and other plants using new energy resources.”51
In the early 1980s, Pyongyang asked the Communist Bloc for
assistance in starting its nuclear energy program. For example, the DPRK
government sent students to Czechoslovakia and East Germany to study
nuclear physics. The Hungarian embassy in Pyongyang explained that
the North Korean students “are concerned mainly about the subject of
nuclear energy and they are interested in every question related to it. This
interest is not a recent one.”52 In 1983, the leadership in Pyongyang asked
49
50
51
52

Moiseyev, “The North Korean Energy Sector,” p. 53.
Lee, North Korea, p. 103.
Moiseyev, “The North Korean Energy Sector,” p. 53.
"Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign
Ministry," April 30, 1981, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive,
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Hungary for technical expertise in nuclear development “since the DPRK
will soon start building its first nuclear power plant.”53 Initially, Kim Il
Sung explained his desire for nuclear power plants as a way to alleviate
the DPRK’s chronic energy shortage. Kim told East German leader Erich
Honecker in May 1984, “During my visit to the Soviet Union, I also made
agreements with our Soviet comrades to build nuclear power plants. We
are convinced that when we have accomplished this task, we will
certainly be able to produce 100 billion kWh of energy. And once we have
done this, developing agriculture is no longer a problem. Once we have
solved the industry problem, nothing else will be an issue.”54 Was the
construction of nuclear energy power plants in the DPRK a Trojan horse
for the regime’s development of nuclear weapons? Perhaps, but I believe
Kim Il Sung initially wanted to use nuclear facilities for energy
production within the DPRK.
In February 1985, the Soviet Union entered into negotiations with
the Kim family regime regarding the construction of the DPRK’s first
nuclear power plant. North Korea’s Premier Kang Seongsan
“emphasized to the deputation that the project to be built was not only
of economic but also of political importance.” As the Hungarian
embassy in Pyongyang commented on the North Korean mindset
concerning nuclear energy, “On the one hand, they would like to offset
the fact that a nuclear power plant is already in operation in South
Korea; on the other hand, [the project] is to enhance the DPRK’s
MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1981, 86. doboz, 72, 003729/1981. Obtained and translated
for NKIDP by Balazs Szalontai, <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/
document/110137> (date accessed May 17, 2020).
53 "Memorandum, Hungarian Academy of Sciences to the Hungarian Foreign
Ministry," March 07, 1983, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive,
MOL, XIX-J-1-k Korea, 1983, 73. doboz, 81-73, 2856/1983. Obtained and
translated for NKIDP by Balazs Szalontai, <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.
org/document/110138> (date accessed May 17, 2020).
54 "Stenographic Record of Conversation between Erich Honecker and Kim
Il Sung," May 30, 1984, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive,
SAPMO-BA, DY 30, 2460. Translated by Grace Leonard, <https://digitalarchive.
wilsoncenter.org/document/113197> (date accessed May 17, 2020).
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economic prestige in foreign eyes.” 55 According to a declassified
document from the CIA, “In December 1985, the Soviets also agreed to
help the North build its first nuclear power plant, which reportedly will
have a capacity of about 1.4 million kilowatts…This project would be a
boon to the North because it would allow for diversification of energy
sources and provide relatively stable supplies.”56 Thus, Kim Il Sung’s
pursuit of nuclear energy may have been economically-motivated rather
than solely military-focused.
In addition, at the same time as the DPRK government covertly
pursued nuclear energy, Kim Il Sung publicly advocated a nuclear-free
zone on the Korean Peninsula. During Erich Honecker’s 1986 visit to
North Korea, Kim Il Sung told his East German counterpart that he
favored Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s proposal of turning the AsiaPacific region into a “peace zone” and was also “in favor of the proposed
halt to the nuclear arms race and averting the danger of a nuclear
inferno.”57 Kim Il Sung particularly detested the presence of U.S. nuclear
weapons on South Korean soil. In July 1988, the North Korean leader
told a visiting East German military delegation, “The Democratic
People's Republic of Korea is confronted with many nuclear weapons in
South Korea that belong to the U.S.” Kim continued, “This is why the
leadership of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has also already
made numerous proposals for the withdrawal of U.S. troops and their
nuclear weapons, for ending the arms race, and for reducing the armed
55 "Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign
Ministry," March 09, 1985, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive,
MOL, XIX-J-1-k Korea, 1985, 76. doboz, 81-532, 2745/1985. Obtained and
translated for NKIDP by Balazs Szalontai, <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.
org/document/110142> (date accessed May 17, 2020).
56 CIA Research Paper, “North Korea: Energy Scene,” Directorate of Intelligence,
July 1987, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIARDP88T00539R000500760002-1.pdf> (date accessed May 17, 2020).
57 “Report on Erich Honecker's visit to North Korea, October 1986,” October 18,
1986, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Foundation Archive of
the Parties and Mass Organizations in the Federal Archive [Berlin] (SAPMO-BA),
DY 30, 2460. Translated by Grace Leonard, <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.
org/document/110758> (date accessed May 17, 2020).
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forces on the Korean Peninsula in stages in order to transform it into a
nuclear-free zone of peace.”58 The U.S. nuclear arsenal in the ROK
greatly worried the security-conscious North Korean leader and made
him into an unlikely champion of nuclear nonproliferation during the
mid to late 1980s.

North Korean Electricity from the 1990s to the Present Day
The 1990s were a tumultuous period for the North Korean
leadership. From Kim Il Sung’s death in 1994 to the nuclear crisis with
the U.S. government, the Kim family regime faced many challenges. For
North Korea’s energy sector, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the
collapse of the Warsaw Pact meant Pyongyang was increasingly isolated
economically and diplomatically on the global stage. With the end of
energy subsidies and aid from the Soviet Union, the North Korean
people encountered even more electricity shortages in the 1990s. With no
Soviet assistance, the energy situation in the DPRK during the 1990s
deteriorated from bad to horrendous and the country’s economy stalled
to a halt. 59 As a way to guarantee regime stability, North Korea
eventually prioritized nuclear weapons development over all domestic
sectors, including electricity. During the 1990s, the leadership in
Pyongyang clung even tighter to militarism. Under Kim Jong Il’s rule,
the nuclear program in the DPRK was to be solely dedicated to military
needs, not electricity shortages. Kim Jong Il also shifted North Korea’s
ideological priorities to Songun (military-first politics). Kim Il Sung’s
balancing act of Juche rhetoric and Soviet dependency in the energy
sector was replaced by Kim Jong Il’s sole focus on militarization.
Known in official DPRK rhetoric as the “Arduous March,” the 1990s
58 “Report on Visit of East German Military Delegation to North Korea,” July 19,
1988, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, SAPMO-BA, DY 30,
2508. Translated by Grace Leonard, <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/
document/113202> (date accessed May 17, 2020).
59 Demick, Nothing to Envy.
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were a period of great suffering and famine for most North Korean
people. Much of this was exacerbated by the lack of electricity.
According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, “During
North Korea’s economic downturn in the early 1990s, the country’s
electricity consumption dropped by more than half from 33 billion
kilowatthours (BkWh) in 1990 to 16 BkWh by 2000. The country
experiences chronic electricity shortages and a deteriorating industrial
sector.”60 According to data from the International Energy Agency (IEA),
North Korea’s “per capita electricity consumption in 2008 remained just
819kWh, substantially lower than the 919kWh recorded in 1971.”61 This
significant drop in electricity consumption suggests that Soviet tutelage
essentially prevented mass blackouts in North Korea. Without Soviet
aid, Kim Jong Il’s regime was unable to prevent constant electricity
shortages around the country.
In addition, testimony from high-level defector Hwang Jang Yop
suggests that Kim Jong Il personally approved electricity requests from
the DPRK’s “power organizations,” such as the military. Hwang said,
“All power organizations directly requested Kim Jong Il to provide
electricity to those organizations and he approved the requests… it was
revealed that Kim approved as many as 190 counts of electricityconcerned requests the power organizations raised.”62 Thus, Kim Jong Il
prioritized certain sectors, such as the military and the police, when it
came to electricity supply. Kim Jong Il exerted personal control over the
DPRK’s scant electricity resources. This energy strategy also pitted the
DPRK’s power organizations against one another and further
consolidated Kim Jong Il’s iron rule. Despite the country’s unstable
electrical grid and Kim Jong Il’s oppressive policies, the North Korean
60 “North Korea: Overview,” U.S Energy Information Administration, June 2018,
<https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.php?iso=PRK> (date
accessed May 17, 2020).
61 Kim Tae Hong, “Economic Collapse Reflected in Scarce Electricity,” DailyNK,
August 6, 2012, <https://www.dailynk.com/english/economic-collapsereflected-in-sca/> (date accessed May 17, 2020).
62 Jae-Cheon Lim, Kim Jong-il's Leadership of North Korea (New York: Routledge,
2008).
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people persevered and participated in local black markets in order to
survive. These black markets became spaces of grassroots capitalism in
the DPRK. Chinese-made solar panels began to be sold in these North
Korean markets.
After Kim Jong Il’s death in 2011, Kim Jong Un took power in the
DPRK and struggled to increase his nation’s electricity supply. However,
Kim Jong Un took a page from his grandfather’s book and enlisted the
help of Russian energy specialists. In 2019, the DPRK and Russian
governments “agreed to continue cooperation in the field of experience
exchange and training specialists for the design, construction and
operation of the 500-kilowatt energy grid.”63 In addition, there have been
talks between Moscow and Pyongyang regarding the construction of an
“electric energy bridge.” In January 2015, Russia’s largest-power
generating company, RusHydro, “signed a memorandum of
understanding with the South Korean company K-water where they
agreed to start preparing a feasibility study for creating an energy bridge
from Russia to the Republic of Korea through the territory of the DPRK.”64
While no concrete results have yet been yielded from this energy bridge
idea, it does suggest that Kim Jong Un’s electrification strategy resembles
his grandfather’s dependency on Moscow for energy assistance.
Under Kim Jong Un’s reign, renewable energy and improving the
country’s electric output has been a domestic priority. Currently, around
55% of North Korean households are equipped with solar panels.65 In
October 2018, DPRK state-run media featured a documentary on
domestic renewable energy products, such as high voltage inverters. The
63 Vusala Abbasova, "Russia Helps North Korea Modernize Its Energy Sector,"
Caspian News, December 11, 2019, <https://caspiannews.com/news-detail/
russia-helps-north-korea-modernize-its-energy-sector-2019-12-11-55/> (date
accessed May 17, 2020).
64 Zakharova, “Economic cooperation between Russia and North Korea,” p. 158.
65 Hyonhee Shin, “Cheap solar panels power consumer appliance boom in
North Korea,” Reuters, April 17, 2019, <https://www.reuters.com/article/usnorthkorea-solar-feature/cheap-solar-panels-power-consumer-appliance-boomin-north-korea-idUSKCN1RT2P1> (date accessed May 17, 2020).
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documentary narrator said, “Electricity was the biggest problem but we
achieved such a highly advanced, cutting-edge technology ourselves
from scratch, which was once monopolized by developed nations.”66 In
addition, Kim Jong Un hopes to expand the state’s alternative energy
resources by investing in “huge sea barriers with electricity-generating
turbines to harness the power of the ocean’s tides.” The North Korean
leader may also be interested in “transforming coal into synthetic fuels
that can serve as substitutes for liquid petroleum fuels like gasoline and
diesel.”67 While the state still mostly depends on hydroelectric and coalfired power plants, this newfound emphasis on renewable energy fits
with global environmentalist trends.
In summation, I aimed to show that North Korea’s electricity
shortages stemmed from an overreliance on Moscow. Despite numerous
setbacks, the North Korean people persisted and remained resilient in the
post-Cold War era. Using solar energy as a way to overcome the nation’s
electricity shortages, the North Korean people are on the cutting edge of
green energy trends and asserted their own agency in solving their energy
scarcity. New evidence suggests that Kim Jong Un is resurrecting Kim Il
Sung’s dependency on Moscow for electrification aid, which may lead to
economic trade imbalances for the DPRK. As I explained in this paper,
North Korea’s electricity issues did not result from the regime’s Juche
ideology. The legacy of Soviet energy dependency left the North Korean
government unprepared for the post-Cold War world.
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